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This work project aims at exploring the role of intergenerational immobility in 
political violence. A cross-country macro-level analysis is done where no significant 
results are found. Additionally, an individual micro-level analysis is done where 
intergenerational mobility (measured through a proxy variable) has a negative 
significant effect in political violence.  
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1. Introduction 
According to the Armed Conflict Report 2014
2
, between the 1
st
 of January and the 
31
st
 of December of 2013 there were 28 active armed conflicts in 25 countries; with 
Africa hosting 12 of these conflicts. Because conflict persists so should the work to 
understand it. Therefore, this work project contributes to the literature on the correlates 
of political violence. In detail, it focuses its efforts in entering the debate of the different 
measures of societal inequality as a source – or at least a correlate – of political 
violence. The aim of this work project is to access the role played by intergenerational 
immobility in explaining political violence.  
In order to answer this question two separate approaches are followed. The first 
entails a macro-level analysis of the relationship between intergenerational immobility 
and political violence. To do so, I first construct the measure of intergenerational 
immobility using a highly adopted method in the intergenerational mobility literature – 
the two-sample two-stage least squares estimator. Then I use this estimated measure of 
                                                          
1
I would like to thank the support and guidance provided by my advisor, Professor Pedro Vicente.  
2
 For more information see: http://ploughshares.ca/programs/armed-conflict/armed-conflicts-report/  
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mobility to test for the relationship between intergenerational mobility and political 
violence. Notice that in order to obtain robustness in the results several extensive 
margin and intensive measures of political violence were used. The second approach 
entails a micro-level individual analysis. This uses a proxy measure of intergenerational 
mobility and relies on survey self-reported measures of well-being and use of violence 
due to political reasons. More specifically, in this section I test if the difference in well-
being of an individual compared to its parents 10 years ago (proxy measure of 
intergenerational mobility) has an effect on individual use of political violence. 
Additionally, I look at the impact in political violence of the different movements of the 
standings in well-being, i.e. i) an upward movement (where an individual is better-off 
than his parents), ii) no movement (where an individual is in the same stand as his 
parents) and, iii) downward movement (where an individual is worse-off than his 
parents). 
Results of the several estimations done go as follows. For the first (macro-level) 
approach, I find no significant effects of the main variable of interest in political 
violence. I find however some significant results on variables such as GPD per capita, 
degree of freedom of a country and amount of urban population (in line with the 
literature). For the second approach (micro-level) I find that the proxy measure of 
mobility yields significant negative effects in political violence. 
The rest of the work project will develop as follows. Section 2 provides a concise 
literature review of the topic. Section 3 contains a theoretical framework. Section 4 
focuses on the empirical results, and it is divided into data description, estimation 
strategy and results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Interest in the causes of conflict is as old as Plato and Aristotle. The later rooted 
civil unrest within the Athenian society in three fundamental causes: “i) the unequal 
nature of Athenian society, ii) frustration with the weakness and incompetence of 
Athens’ leaders and iii) the desire for the wealth and privilege that holding political 
office may entail” (Jacoby, 2008, p.10). All three ideas have been explored by 
economics using different datasets and methodologies with the intent to explain political 
violence or, more frequently, the starkest manifestation of such violence: civil war.  
Seminal work by Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004) shows that greed rather than 
grievance explains rebellion. They find that economic factors, particularly the ability to 
finance and organize a rebellion (captured by the existence of natural resources, as well 
as economic growth and male secondary education enrollment) strongly predict the 
outbreak of a civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) conclude that proxies for political 
grievances such as ethnic and religious diversity have little explanatory power in 
predicting the onset of a civil war. Additionally, proxies for state institutional capacity 
and strength (most importantly measured by per capita income) are considered robust 
predictors of civil war. Montlavo and Reynal-Querol (2005) who study the relationship 
between conflict and ethnic polarization (introduced in the theoretical work of Esteban 
and Ray, 1994, 1999) provide significant support for “deep cleavages” along large 
group lines to affect conflict. Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) draw from the 
theoretical work of Esteban and Ray (2011) to study the impact of ethnic divisions on 
conflict. More specifically, they look at polarization, fractionalization and the Gini-
Greenberg index, and link them to conflict intensity finding significant evidence that 
these distributional measures matter for conflict. Additionally, Dixon (2009), provides 
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an overview of other explanatory variables that have been considered as correlates of 
conflict such as population, geographical and environmental variables. 
Inequality has been highly disregarded as a consistent way to explain conflict. 
Despite the great amount of approaches undertaken in order to identify the role of 
inequality in political violence, it is not clear that inequality (traditionally measured by 
the Gini index) has a correlation with conflict. Explanations in the literature for the non-
existence of this relation draw for reasons such as the lack of good measurement and 
availability of data for inequality. Moreover discussions on the explanatory power of 
different types of inequality, e.g. vertical inequality, horizontal inequality, inequality 
within the same group, for political violence seem to play an important role. It is within 
this context that the measurement of intergenerational mobility, i.e., the way that 
inequality persists across generations, plays in the incidence and magnitude of political 
violence. 
3. Theory 
The theoretical framework used follows a very simplistic approach to the extensive 
work of Besley and Persson (2011). Although the aim of the empirical part of this work 
is not directly related to the model it is still a good framework to understand 
mechanisms of inequality in explaining political violence. 
Let’s consider a two period model s = 1, 2 and two groups of individuals (A, B), 
with half the population each. In the beginning of the first period one of the groups 
holds power (incumbent) I1 ∈ {A, B}, the other group is opposition O1 ∈ {A, B}. γ, is a 
measure of political instability. More specifically, it is the outcome of a potential 
conflict that is triggered by investments in violence by the incumbent and the 
opposition.  
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The utility function of an individual is given by us
J = cs
J + αsgs, where private 
consumption cs
J
 depends on the net tax income (1 − ts)y(p𝑠
𝐽) and transfer received rs
J
. 
gs is a public good (and here we assume a linear relation). And αs has a two-point 
distribution αs ∈ {𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐻}, where 𝛼𝐻 > 2 > 𝛼𝐿 > 1 and Prob[αs = αH] = ∅. The 
income tax is constrained by existing fiscal capacity (ts < 𝜏𝑠). y(. ) is and increasing 
concave function. y(p𝑠
𝐽) is wages or ownership of other factors such as land or capital. 










, where 𝑅 is time-independent revenue source accruing only to government and 
𝑚𝑠 = ℱ(𝜏2 − 𝜏1) + ℒ(π2 − π1) + 𝜔(π1)𝐿
𝐼 if 𝑠 = 1 and 0 if 𝑠 = 2 is the investment 







]; the incumbent must give a fixed share 𝜎 to the opposition for any unit 
of transfers awarded to its own group. 
The timing of events is the following: 
1. We begin with initial stock of state capacities {𝜏1, 𝜋1} and an incumbent group 
𝐼1. Nature determines 𝛼1and R. 




O} and determines through 
investments the period-2 stocks of fiscal and legal capacity {𝜏2, 𝜋2}. 𝐼1 and 𝑂1 
simultaneously invest in violence levels 𝐿𝐼 and 𝐿𝑂. 
3. 𝐼1 remains in power with probability 1- γ(L
o, LI, ), and nature determines 𝛼2.  









O} so as to 
maximize αsgs + (1 − ts)y(ps
I ) + rs
I . Subject to ts ≤ τs, ps
I ≤ πs, and rs
O ≥ σrs
I  and the 
government budget constraint. To obtain investments in political violence agents 
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maximize the expected utility period-2 utility of group J in period 1: W(α1, τ1, m1, β
J) +
(1 − γ(Lo, LI, ))UI(τ2, π2) + γ(L
o, LI, )UO(τ2, π2) for the incumbent group, and 
W(α1, τ1, m1, β
J) − ω(π1)L
O + γ(Lo, LI, )UI(τ2, π2) +  (1 − γ(L
o, LI, ))UO(τ2, π2) 
for the opposition group. 𝜔(𝜋1)𝐿
𝑂, is the private cost of violence and needs to be 
deducted for the opposition group. The incumbent uses public funds. 
Inequality is one of the extensions introduced in the model and it is constructed by 
considering differences in wages between the incumbent and the opposition groups with 
ωJ for J ∈ {I, O}. Let there be two levels of wages ωJ ∈ {ωL, ωH}. Let ω denote the 
average wage ω = (ωH + ωL)/2.  
The authors present some predictions of the introduction of inequality in the model, 
which I translate here. If the incumbent is poor it will lead to a higher investment in 
state capacity. On the other hand, if the incumbent is rich it will diminish the investment 
on fiscal capacity. Additionally, some discussion is also introduced on the effect of 
inequality in investments in political violence. According to the authors, an asymmetry 
in wages might make the richest group less inclined to violence. This can be called a 
“loyalty premium”, where the high income group would recruit people from its own 
ranks increasing the cost of violence. However, rich and violence-prone groups would 
wish to hire low-wage individuals to carry out violence on their behalf. Moreover, one 
group could be better organized in raising resources for fighting when in opposition, 
i.e., lowering the costs of violence, making political violence more likely.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Data 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) – The DHS Program is a household survey 
conducted consistently and periodically across different countries since 1984, providing 
a solid base for a cross country analysis. Currently, the DHS is in its seventh phase, 
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however due to data fit and availability, only phases two through five are used (1991-
2013)
3
. The structure of the dataset allows for the collection of information on an 
individual’s wealth and characteristics provided he is the head of the household, as well 
as individual characteristics of other members of the household. More specifically, 
information collected on the individuals’ wealth is constituted by household 
characteristics and ownership of goods
4
. The relevant individual characteristics 
provided for both head of household and other members of the household are age, 
education, and type of location of residence (urban or rural)
5
. This dataset allows for the 
estimation of intergenerational mobility
6
.  
Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episode of Political Violence (MEPV) – A MEPV 
is defined “by the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups 
that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the episode”
7
. The 
MEPV dataset contains information from 1946 until 2014 on magnitude scores of 
MEPV for all countries. The information contained in this dataset is transformed into a 
dummy variable that reports simply the existence or not of a MEPV by country and 
year.  
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) – The ACLED is a 
comprehensive dataset on political violence for developing states. The latest version 
(Version 5) is used and includes data from 1997 until 2014. The ACLED main focus is 
on politically violent events, which are defined as “a single altercation where often force 
                                                          
3
 First-round of surveys did not include the questions that provided the required information. Sixth and 
seventh rounds are not yet complete and/or available for every country.  
4
 Household characteristics and ownership of goods: source of drinking water, location of water source, 
toilet facilities, material of construction of the roof-top, number of rooms in the household per person, 
electricity, radio, television, mobile-phone, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle and car. 
5
 To avoid different cultural settings for women across countries, only men are considered. 
6
 Countries for which this dataset is complete and available are: Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia 
7
 For more information see http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2014.pdf, page 2 
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is used by one or more groups for a political end (…)”
8
 .The dataset contains 
information on dates and locations of political violence as well as estimated reported 
fatalities per event of political violence.  
Afrobarometer – The Afrobarometer dataset provides micro-level information on 
“…the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa”
9
. Round two (2004) of the 
Afrobarometer dataset is used
10
. More specifically, the information is provided by the 
following questions: i) “on a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 
are “rich” people: Which number would you give your parents ten years ago?”, ii) “on a 
scale between 0 and 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 are “rich” people: Which 
number would you give yourself today?”, and iii) “… please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this 
if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause?” The first two 
questions provide a way to estimate a proxy for intergenerational mobility. The third 
question provides information on self-reported use of violence due to political reasons
11
.  
Other datasets – The Word Development Indicators (WDI) dataset is used to obtain 
information on i) Gini Coefficient, ii) GDP per capita and iii) Urban Population. Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) is used to obtain data on percent of mountainous terrain. Information 
on the degree of freedom of a country is taken from the Freedom House dataset. 
Measures of Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Polarization are taken from Montlavo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005). 
 
 
                                                          
8
 For more information see: 
http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdf  (page 7) 
9
For more information see: http://www.afrobarometer.org/ 
10
 To avoid different cultural settings for women only men are considered. 
11
 Countries for which this dataset was complete and available are: Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal South Africa, Uganda and 
Zambia.  
- 9 - 
 
4.2. Estimation Strategy 
In order to analyze the relation between intergenerational immobility and 
political violence two different approaches are established. The first uses macro-level 
data and entails first, the construction of a measure of intergenerational immobility. 
This allows cross-country analysis of intergenerational immobility and political 
violence. The second uses micro-level data, individual level analysis of 
intergenerational mobility and political violence.  
This section is therefore divided in three parts. The first provides the estimation 
strategy for the construction of the variable of intergenerational immobility. The second 
demonstrates the specifications used to obtain a macro-level relation between 
intergenerational immobility (using the measure obtained in the first stage) and political 
violence. The third provides the estimation strategy for a micro-level analysis of 
intergenerational mobility and political violence.  
4.2.1. Measurement of Intergenerational Immobility 
The measurement of intergenerational immobility is often done through 
intergenerational elasticity (IGE) which is provided by the following equation: 
Yi = β0 + β1Ypi + εi     (1) 
where Yi is life-time earnings of the children, Ypi is life-time earnings of parents, β0 is a 
constant, εi is the error term and β1  is the measure of intergenerational immobility 
(IGE). When β1  is zero, life-time earnings of the children do not depend on the parents’ 
life-time earnings (full mobility); when β1  is one, life-time earnings of the children 
depend fully on the life-time earnings of the parents (no mobility).  
Recurrent issues in the intergenerational mobility literature related with data 
availability and fitness of survey method impede the estimation to be done as described 
above. The two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV) estimator firstly described in 
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Angrist and Krueger (1992) is a broadly accepted method that mitigates data restriction 
issues. More specifically, this project uses the two-sample two-stage least squares 
estimator (TS2SLS) first used by Björklund and Jäntti (1997) to estimate 
intergenerational mobility, that was massively adopted in the intergenerational mobility 
literature. This method is asymptotically more efficient (Inoue and Solon, 2010), and 
computationally easier than TSIV. The TS2SLS estimation relies on two distinct 
samples. A sample of individuals (secondary sample) that constitute a set of pseudo-
parents, used to predict life-time earnings of an individual with a given set of 
characteristics. A second sample of individuals (main sample) that constitute the 
children that report on their own earnings and characteristics, as well as their parents’ 
characteristics.  
Provided the structure and content of the DHS dataset the two samples for the 
estimation of intergenerational mobility through TS2SLS are obtained by splitting the 
overall sample into two. The secondary sample is constituted by male individuals born 
before 1960 that are heads of household (pseudo-father). The main sample is constituted 
by male individuals born after 1960 that are heads of household and whose father lives 
in the household (son). The wealth of the individual is used as a proxy for his life-time 
earnings.  
Equations 2, 3, and 4 are the sequence of specifications that allow for estimation 
of intergenerational immobility (IGE). LetWfj, be wealth of an individual in the 
secondary sample. Let Ŵfi be the predicted wealth of the father of the individual in the 
main sample. LetWsi be wealth of an individual in the main sample. Let Xfj and  Xfi  be 
a vector of characteristics, namely age, education and a dummy for urban location of the 
household of an individual.  
Wfj = γ0 + γ1Xfj + εj     (2) 
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Ŵfi = γ1Xfi       (3) 
Wsi = β0 + β1Ŵfi + εi     (4) 
β1 is the estimated measure of intergenerational association of wealth between sons and 
fathers; when equal to zero it means full mobility, and when equal to one it means there 
is no mobility.β1 (IGE) is the value that is used in the next stage.  
4.2.2. Intergenerational Immobility and Political Violence 
The macro-level relationship between intergenerational immobility and political 
violence is captured using extensive and intensive measures of political violence as 
described below. Let the following equation (5) be the baseline for the several 
estimations done. 
Political Violencect = δ0 + δ1IGEct + δ2Xct + δ3Xc + εct (5) 
As previously mentioned two types of measures of political violence are considered. 
The first type (an extensive measure), focuses on the existence of i) a MEPV (1 if there 
is a major episode of political violence, and 0 otherwise) by country and year and ii) 
existence of deaths (1 if there is at least one reported death, and 0 otherwise), provided a 
politically violent occurrence has been registered, by country and year. We therefore 
estimate the coefficients through maximum likelihood with a logistic specification. The 
second type of measure of political violence tries to capture the intensity (magnitude) of 
political violence. Thus, it uses intensive measures of political violence. The first being 
the number of politically violent events registered by country and year and the second 
being the number of deaths, provided a politically violent event was registered, by 
country and year. The estimation of the coefficients is done using ordinary least squares.  
The right side of the equation is similar in all specifications. δ0 is a constant. IGEct 
is the previously estimated measure of intergenerational immobility by country and 
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year. X𝑐𝑡 is a vector, per year and country, of characteristics. X𝑐 is a vector of country 
characteristics. 𝜀𝑐𝑡, is an error term.  
4.2.3. Intergenerational Mobility Proxy and Political Violence 
The relationship between self-reported perceived intergenerational mobility and 
self-reported use of violent behavior due to political reasons is estimated in this section. 
The micro-level relationship between intergenerational mobility and political violence is 
given by the following equation: 
Individual Political Violencei = δ0 + δ1IGE Proxyi + δ2Xi + δ3Xl + εi (6) 
where Individual Political Violencei is an ordered categorical variable of self-reported 
use of violence due to political reasons (0=No, would never do this, 1=No, but would do 
if had the chance, 2=Yes, once or twice, 3=Yes, several times, 4=Yes, often). 
IGE Proxyi is the difference between self-reported current well-being of an individual 
and the well-being of its parents 10 years ago (integer scale between -10 and 10; -10=an 
individual is 10 times worse than its parents, 0=an individual has the same well-being as 
his parents, 10=an individual is 10 times better than his parents). Xi is a vector of 
individual characteristics
12
 and Xl is a vector of location controls
13
. 
Issues of endogeneity do not go unnoticed throughout the work. Indeed one 
might argue that reasons that explain the difference in well-being between individuals 
and parents might be the same that explain the engagement in political violence. One 
common approach to deal with issues of endogeneity is to introduce an instrumental 
variable (IV). The basic idea behind the use of an IV is to find a variable that explains 
                                                          
12
 Individual control variables: age, head of household dummy, urban dummy, no schooling (base 
category), complete primary schooling, complete secondary schooling, higher education, no employment 
(base category), part time employment, full time employment, income (first quintile), income (second 
quintile), income (third quintile) (base category), income (fourth quintile), income (fifth quintile). 
13
 Location control variables: dummy for school, dummy for police station, dummy for piped water, 
dummy for electricity grid, dummy for health clinic, dummy for sewage. 
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the dependent variable only through its effect in the independent variable. In detail the 
necessary conditions to use an IV are the following:  
Cov(𝑍, x) ≠ 0     (7) 
Cov(𝑍, ε) = 0     (8) 
Equation 7, states that the instrument (Z) must be correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable. Equation 8, also known as the exclusion restriction, states that the 
instrument (Z) must be exogenous, i.e., it must be uncorrelated with any other 
determinants of the dependent variable. 
In this specific context, we want to explain the use of violence due to political 
reasons trough a variable that is only related to the difference in well-being between 
individuals and their parents. A thorough exploration of the dataset available led me to 
believe that a measure of availability of goods
14
 might work as a good IV provided a 
good control of an array of other variables. The main idea behind the use of this IV, is 
that provided the extensive use of control variables that influence the well-being of an 
individual, the availability of goods might be linked to political violence solely through 
the difference in well-being between individuals and their parents. Therefore the first-
stage regression (equation 9) and then the reduced form (equation 10) are estimated:  
IGE Proxyi = ϑ0 + ϑ1Zi + ϑ2Xi + ϑ3Xl + ωi   (9) 
Individual Political Violencei = δ0 + δ1Zi + δ2Xi + δ3Xl + εi  (10) 
where Zi is as ordered categorical variable of the availability of goods compared to the 
past (1= Much Worse, 2=Worse, 3=About the Same, 4=Better, 5=Much Better). All 
other variables are equal to equation 6.  
                                                          
14
 The specific survey question and possible answers are the following:  
 Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the 
same: The availability of goods?  
 1= Much Worse, 2=Worse, 3=About the Same, 4=Better, 5=Much Better 
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Throughout this project one main assumption that has been in place is that 
mobility (or immobility) has the same impact on political violence whether it allows for 
an individual to improve his life easily (upward mobility) or to worsen his life easily 
(downward mobility). In order to try to understand the differences of the effect of the 
two movements on political violence we replace the previous proxy variable of 
intergenerational mobility with a categorical variable that comprises the three types of 
movements that are observed when comparing an individual’s well-being with his 
parents well-being 10 years ago (worse – or downward mobility, equal – or no mobility, 
and better – or upward mobility). The estimation follows the equation: 
Individual Political Violencei = δ0 + C1IGE Proxy𝑖 + δ2Xi + δ3Xl + εi 
15
(11) 
IGE Proxy𝑖 is therefore a three category  variable of the difference between the current 
well-being of an individual and the well-being of its parents 10 years ago; base category 
is Downward Mobility (negative difference), No Mobility (no difference) and Upward 
Mobility (positive difference). All other variables are the same as in equation 6.  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Measurement of Intergenerational Mobility 
Table 1 provides an example of first-step estimation by Ordinary Least Squares 
for the estimation of IGE. Level of education and urban/rural location are persistently 
significant at 1% level across the specifications of the three years (2003, 2008, and 
2013). Having complete primary or secondary or higher education studies increases the 
level of wealth, on average, ceteris paribus, compared to the base category (no 
education). Living in an urban region increases wealth of an individual, on average, 
ceteris paribus. Age of an individual is significant at a 10% level in 2008 and 2013 and 
it has a positive effect. 
                                                          
15
 Small variations of this equation are presented to account for income levels as well as interaction 
between types of mobility (downward mobility, no mobility, and upward mobility) and income levels.  
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Table 2 provides the second stage regression. The predicted fathers’ wealth is 
significant in all specifications. Having complete secondary level of schooling or above 
is also significant in 2008 and 2013. However, despite the significance in this specific 
country of some levels of education in determining wealth of an individual, the IGE 
estimates that are considered for the next stages of the project are in columns 1
16
. Table 
3 provides a summary of all (country and year) IGE estimates.  
 
 
                                                          
16
 Including the measure of IGE that also takes into account the levels of education of an individual is 
difficult in the context of a cross-country analysis where levels and degree of importance attributed to 
education are different across countries. 
Table 1: First-Step Estimation (Nigeria)
2003 2008 2013
C. Primary  1.242*** 0.914***  1.072***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
C. Secondary 1.936*** 1.521*** 1.616***
(0.23) (0.07) (0.06)
Higher Education 2.760*** 2.551***  2.381***  
(0.14) (0.07) (0.06)
Age 0.002 0.003* 0.003*  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urban  1.476***  1.698***  1.324*** 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 2735 8613 8199
Adjusted RSq 0.423 0.432 0.425
Pseudo-Fathers' Wealth
Note: OLS first-stage estimation. Pseudo-Fathers' Wealth, wealth of an individual born before
1960, head of household. No Education, dummy variable, 1 if individual has not completed
primary schooling and 0 otherwise (base category). C. Primary, dummy variable, 1 if individual
has completed primary school and 0 otherwise. C. Secondary, dummy variable, 1 if individual
has completed secondary schooling and 0 otherwise. Higher Education, dummy variable, 1 if an
individual studies after secondary school and 0 otherwise. Age, age of an individual measured
in years. Urban, dummy variable, 1 if individual lives in an urban area and 0 if it lives in a rural
area. Constant Omitted. Robust standard errors presented in parenthesis. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2: IGE Estimation (Nigeria)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
P. Father Wealth 0.632*** 0.426* 0.451* 0.551*** 0.442*** 0.456*** 0.511*** 0.391*** 0.414***
[0.00]   [0.52] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
C. Primary 0.075 0.084 0.018 0.033 0.100 0.099
[0.52] [0.47] [0.80] [0.64] [0.08] [0.11]
C. Secondary 0.045 0.042 0.259*** 0.267*** 0.149* 0.152*
[0.70] [0.73] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02]
Higher Education 0.367 0.362 0.318*** 0.312*** 0.401*** 0.358***
[0.09] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 0.107 0.103 0.174**
[0.29] [0.15] [0.01]
Observations 43 43 43 149 149 149 188 188 188
Adjusted RSq 0.385 0.423 0.420 0.299 0.410 0.417 0.257 0.364 0.389
2003 2008 2013
Sons' Wealth
Note: OLS second-stage IGE estimation. Sons' Wealth, wealth of an individual born in and after 1960, head of
household, whose father lives in the same household. P. Father Wealth, predicted wealth of the father of an
individual born in and after 1960, head of household, whose father lives in the same household. No Education,
dummy variable, 1 if individual has not completed primary schooling and 0 otherwise (base category). C.
Primary, dummy variable, 1 if individual has completed primary school and 0 otherwise. C. Secondary, dummy
variable, 1 if individual has completed secondary schooling and 0 otherwise. Higher Education, dummy variable, 
1 if an individual studies after secondary school and 0 otherwise. Age, age of an individual measured in years.
Beta Coefficients presented. P-values in brackets. * significant 10%; ** significant 5%; *** significant 1%. 
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4.3.2. Intergenerational Immobility and Political Violence 
As mentioned in the previous section, two separate analysis of political violence 
were implemented. The first takes into consideration two extensive margin measures of 
political violence (the existence of a MEPV and the existence of casualties provided that 
an event of political violence is registered). The second takes into consideration the 
intensity of a political violent event by looking at the number of registered occurrences 
per year and also at number of casualties per year (provided there was a political violent 
conflict registered).  
Table 4 reports results on the first approach taken. The signal is positive for 
intergenerational immobility, i.e. has immobility increases the probability of both the 
existence of a MEPV and the existence of at least one casualty provided there was a 
politically violent event increase. The results are however not significant in all 
Table 3: Summary Table of Estimated Intergenerational Elasticity (IGE)
Ghana Kenya Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal Tanzania Uganda Zambia
1991 . . . . . . . . 0.175 . .
1992 . . . . . 0.856 . 0.715 . . 0.620
1993 0.685 0.621 . . . . . . . . .
1995 . . . 0.256 . . . . . 0.463 .
1996 . . . . . . . . . . 0.894
1997 . . . . 0.527 . . . . . .
1998 0.917 . . . . . . . . . .
2000 . . 0.240 . . 0.681 . . . 0.453 .
2001 . . . 0.563 . . . . . . 0.860
2003 0.877 0.483 . . 0.507 . 0.632 . . . .
2004 . . 0.233 . . . . . 0.507 . .
2005 . . . . . . . 0.564 . . .
2006 . . . 0.597 . 0.574 . . . 0.178 .
2007 . . . . . . . . . . 0.676
2008 0.517 0.876 . . . . 0.551 . . . .
2009 . . . . 0.890 . . . . . .
2010 . . 0.371 . . . . 0.659 0.654 . .
2011 . . . . 0.797 . . . . 0.632 .
2012 . . . 0.889 . . . . . . .
2013 . . . . . 0.643 0.511 . . . .
Note: Summary table of direct estimation of IGE correspondent to column (1) of Table 2, for each country
and each year.
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specifications. Other measures of inequality are also not statistically significant across 
any specification in neither measure of political violence. Some significant positive 
effects are captured for GDP per capita, i.e., a higher GDP per capita increases the 
probability of the existence a politically violent event; however results are not robust 
across the two conflict datasets. The measure of the degree of freedom of a country is 
also statistically significant across all specifications for the existence of a MEPV and it 
holds the expected sign (more freedom, lower probability of a MEPV occurring). The 
share of urban population has a significant (positive) effect on the existence of a MEPV.  
Table 5 reports on the intensive measures of political violence. As can be observed. 
IGE remains with a positive sign, although, still not statistically significant in either 
variable. The only variable that captures persistent significant effects on the number of 
politically violent events is the degree of freedom. It holds the expected value, more 
freedom correlated to less reported occurrences of political violence. The share of urban 
population holds significant results across the two variables in the specifications that do 
not include time dummies: a higher amount of urban population increases both the 
number of politically violent events and number of deaths.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
IGE 3.224 3.805 3.675 0.540 1.235 4.498 10.982 10.707 6.632 10.227
(4.14) (5.06) (4.74) (3.51) (4.90) (3.20) (6.26) (6.51) (3.60) (8.33)
Ethnic Fractionalization -9.712 -86.266 -32.111 -111.127
(11.12) (100.28) (20.55) (107.41)
Ethnic Polarization 0.475 -51.555 20.267 -59.763
(4.22) (56.52) (12.87) (53.59)
Gini Coefficient 0.186 0.355 -0.099 0.046
(0.11) (0.21) (0.06) (0.17)
GDP per capita 0.909*** 1.125** 0.924*** 1.153** 0.713 0.544* 2.119 2.404 0.447* 0.606
(0.22) (0.36) (0.26) (0.38) (0.54) (0.23) (1.19) (1.32) (0.23) (0.82)
Degree of Freedom -1.025*** -1.050*** -0.947*** -1.652** -1.325*** -0.160 -0.650 -0.655 0.101 0.255
(0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.59) (0.24) (0.45) (0.57) (0.54) (0.59) (0.42)
Urban Population 9.08E-08** 9.72E-08*** 8.73E-08*** 3.07E-07 1.42E-07** 3.35E-07 9.64E-07 1.11E-06 1.47E-07 1.11E-07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mountainous Terrain -0.026 0.010 -0.019 -0.074 -0.049 0.062 0.028 0.047 0.122 0.046
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.15) (0.05)
Constant 482.404*** 577.793** 513.654*** 390.905 76.391 129.826 937.467 1024.097 107.879 108.381
(132.02) (179.89) (135.96) (264.65) (96.40) (330.32) (671.49) (707.21) (392.10) (97.94)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes no
Observations 39 35 35 39 35 30 27 27 30 27
Number of countries 11 10 10 11 10 11 10 10 11 10
Pseudo RSq 0.563 0.551 0.542 0.624 0.644 0.252 0.372 0.357 0.277 0.358
Table 4: Extensive Political Violence and Intergenerational Mobility
Extensive - MEPV Extensive - Fatalities
Note: Maximum Likelihood in a logit specification. Extensive –MEPV, dummy variable equal to 1 if a MEPV occurred and 0 otherwise (a MEPV is an occurrence with more than 500
deaths), source: Center for Systemic Peace. Extensive – Fatalities, dummy variable (provided there was a registered episode of political violence) equal to 1 if there is at least one death
and 0 otherwise, source: ACLED. IGE, measure of intergenerational mobility that varies between 0 and 1, where 0 represents full mobility and 1 represents no mobility. Ethnic
Fractionalization, index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization calculated using the data of the WCE, source: Montlavo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Ethnic Polarization, index of
ethnolinguistic polarization calculated using the data of the WCE, source: Montlavo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Gini Coefficient, GINI index, source: WDI. GDP per capita, log of real
GDP per capita (current LCU), source: WDI. Degree of Freedom, scale between 1 and 7, 1 being the least free and 7 being the most free, source: Freedom House. Urban Population,
urban population, source: WDI. Mountainous Terrain, percent of mountainous terrain, source: Fearon and Laitin (2003). Robust standard errors are clustered by country and presented
in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Intensive Political Violence and Intergenerational Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
IGE 125.943 200.730 184.204 164.301 167.034 749.142 1356.519 1218.729 1352.602 180.503
(191.06) (236.70) (230.73) (215.55) (196.01) (1257.89) (841.06) (812.51) (1362.15) (1248.23)
Ethnic Fractionalization -279.318 -4679.902 -554.357 -32142.44
(407.51) (2328.64) (3155.51) (15981.60)
Ethnic Polarization 122.692 -2596.751   -131.1583 -17879.71
(230.36) (1184.27) (2013.97) (7994.43)
Gini Coefficient -3.703 10.980 -58.265 58.181
(6.30) (7.20) (53.19) (46.89)
GDP per capita 11.264 34.529 32.546 6.568 21.374 26.535 156.134 124.550 -47.343 102.902
(18.57) (21.10) (21.67) (23.54) (18.84) (171.75) (171.24) (184.54) (190.27) (160.59)
Degree of Freedom -83.996* -81.929**    -80.854**   -84.408*   -47.241 -671.76 -580.686 -570.915 -678.243* -358.729
(29.42) (18.58) (19.23) (28.43) (21.88) (327.91) (265.79) (184.54) (250.09) (191.49)
Urban Population 3.58E-06 -2.58E-06   -2.60E-06  3.04E-06   7.88E-06***  0.0000512 2.77E-06 3.34E-06 4.27E-05 7.67E-05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 239.8594 99.1899 -155.115  855.538 4603.913* 2696.325 -486.2375 -405.5217 8929.249 33262.82*
(258.02) (128.04) (551.86) (806.90) (1965.79) (2773.64) (1162.22) (3199.03) (6744.29) (13979.39)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes no
Observations 30 27 27 30 27 30 27 27 30 27
Number of countries 11 10 10 11 10 11 10 10 11 10
Adjusted RSq 0.471 0.886 0.882 0.441 0.539 0.547 0.897 0.897 0.570 0.580
Intensive – Number of Events Intensive – Fatalities
Note: OLS estimation. Intensive - Number of Events, count variable on the number of registered episodes of political violence per year, source: ACLED. Intensive –
Fatalities, (provided there was a registered episode of political violence) count of deaths per year, source: ACLED. Ethnic Fractionalization, index of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization calculated using the data of the WCE, source: Montlavo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Ethnic Polarization, index of ethnolinguistic polarization calculated
using the data of the WCE, source: Montlavo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Gini Coefficient, GINI index, source: WDI. GDP per capita, log of real GDP per capita (current LCU), 
source: WDI. Degree of Freedom, scale between 1 and 7, 1 being the least free and 7 being the most free, source: Freedom House. Urban Population, urban population,
source: WDI. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and presented in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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4.3.3. Intergenerational Mobility Proxy and Political Violence 
This section shows the results for the estimations conducted with the 
Afrobarometer dataset. Table 6 reports the results relative to equation 6.and equation 
10. Table 7 reports the results relative to equation 11.  
 
The coefficients of the proxy measure of intergenerational mobility hold 
significant results (at 10%) across all specifications. The sign of the coefficients indicate 
that if an individual perceives to be better off than its parents 10 years ago, the 
probability of using violence due to political reasons reduces. The cut-offs are 
statistically significant which indicates that the explanatory variable does not need to be 
collapsed.  
Table 6: Proxy Mobility and Political Violence
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IGE Proxy -0.030* -0.028* -0.030*  -0.188**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)
cut1 1.63***  1.74*** 1.45*** .
cut2 2.77***  2.89*** 2.61*** .
cut3  3.55*** 3.67***  3.39***  .
cut4  4.51***  4.64***   4.36*** .
Individual Controls no no yes yes
Location Controls no no yes yes
Country Fixed Effects no yes yes yes
Observations 4832 4832 4832 4832
Ologit
Note: Column (1) (2) (3), Maximum Likelihood in an ordered logit specification.
Explained variable, ordered categorical variable on self-reported use of
violence due to political reasons (0=No, would never do this, 1=No, but would
do if had the chance, 2=Yes, once or twice, 3=Yes, several times, 4=Yes, often). 
Column (4), Instrumental Variable estimation, instrument is Present vs Past
availability of goods (1= Much Worse, 2=Worse, 3=About the Same, 4=Better,
5=Much Better). Proxy IGE, difference between self-reported current well-
being of an individual and the well-being of its parents 10 years ago (integer
scale between -10 and 10; -10=an individual is 10 times worse than its parents,
0=an individual has the same well-being as his parents, 10=an individual is 10
times better than his parents). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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The results of the instrumental variable estimation also present a negative 
significant relation between the self-reported measure of use of political violence and 
the intergenerational difference in well-being
17
. 
The results in Table 7 show the role of upward, non-existent and downward 
mobility on the probability of an individual using violence due to political reasons. 
Notice that across specifications 1, 3, and 5, having no mobility reduces significantly (at 
a 10% level) political violence compared with the base category (downward mobility). 
Additionally, in specifications 2, 4, and 6, in which the main objective was not only to 
capture the effect of an upward or downward movement of intergenerational well-being 
difference but also to understand if the current income position played any role, we 
observe that measures of mobility have no significance. However, belonging to the fifth 
quintile (as compared to the base category – third quintile) increases significantly (at 
5% level) the probability of engaging in political violence. The interaction term between 
having no mobility and belonging to the fifth quintile reduces significantly the 
probability of an individual using violence due to political reasons. All cut-offs are 
statistically significant which means that the categories on the explained variable do not 
need to be collapsed.  
 
 
                                                          
17
 First-stage estimation of the instrumental variable is presented in appendix in Table A.4.  




Table 7: Categorical Proxy Mobility and Political Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Mobility -0.247* -0.089 -0.227* -0.062 -0.219* -0.068
(0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16)
Upward Mobility -0.164 -0.168 -0.169 -0.162 -0.171 -0.155
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14)
Income (first quintile) -0.200 -0.148 -0.158
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Income (second quintile) 0.228 0.238 0.233
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Income (fourth quintilde) -0.042 -0.084 -0.046
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Income (fifth quintilde) 0.597** 0.601** 0.633**  
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
No Mobility * Income (first quintile) -0.027 0.012 0.035
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
No Mobility * Income (second quintile) -0.499 -0.501 -0.474
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
No Mobility * Income (fourth quintile) 0.150 0.079 0.102
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
No Mobility * Income (fifth quintile) -1.115* -1.200*  -1.164* 
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Upward Mobility * Income (first quintile) 0.185 0.195 0.196
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Upward Mobility * Income (second quintile) -0.268 -0.274 -0.263
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Upward Mobility * Income (fourth quintile) 0.137 0.138 0.129
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Upward Mobility * Income (fifth quintile) -0.159 -0.188 -0.162
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
cut1 1.51***  1.56*** 1.62***  1.71***  1.33*** 1.38*** 
cut2 2.65*** 2.71*** 2.77*** 2.86*** 2.48*** 2.54***  
cut3  3.43***  3.48*** 3.55*** 3.64*** 3.27*** 3.32***  
cut4 4.40*** 4.45*** 4.52*** 4.61*** 4.23*** 4.29***  
Individual Controls no no no no yes yes
Location Controls no no no no yes yes
Country Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 4832 4832 4832 4832 4832 4832
Note: Maximum Likelihood in an ordered logit specification. Explained variable, ordered categorical variable on self-
reported use of violence due to political reasons (0=No, would never do this, 1=No, but would do if had the chance,
2=Yes, once or twice, 3=Yes, several times, 4=Yes, often). Explanatory variable a categorical variable of the difference
between the current well-being of an individual and the well-being of its parents 10 years ago; base category is Downward
Mobility (negative difference), No Mobility (no difference) and Upward Mobility (positive difference). Income (first
quintile), dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to the first quintile and 0 otherwise. Income (second quintile),
dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to the second quintile and 0 otherwise. Income (third quintile), dummy
variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to the third quintile and 0 otherwise (base category). Income (fourth quintile),
dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to the fourth quintile and 0 otherwise. Income (fifth quintile), dummy
variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to the fifth quintile and 0 otherwise. Interaction terms are represented by ‘*’.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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5. Conclusion 
This work project had as its main objective to introduce intergenerational mobility 
has a source of political violence. To do so, two separate approaches were undertaken. 
The first relied on macro-level data to do a cross-country analysis. No significant effects 
were found on the measure of intergenerational mobility in explaining political 
violence. Some significant results on variables such as GPD per capita, degree of 
freedom of a country and amount of urban population (in line with the literature) when 
taking into consideration the existence of a MEPV. The second approach used micro-
level data to construct a proxy measure of IGE. I find that a higher positive difference in 
well-being of an individual as compared to its parents ten years ago reduces 
significantly the probability of the use of violence due to political reasons.  
There are several fronts in which this field of research might benefit from future 
work. The first is the development of a theoretical model that introduces not only 
inequality, but also mobility of individuals in explaining political violence. Moreover, 
mechanisms that lead to political violence should be further investigated. The second is 
data availability and fitness to be able to better improve empirical estimations. The third 
is to further explore micro-level mechanisms in understanding engagement in political 
violence.  
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Ghana Kenya Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Pseudo-Father
Wealth -0.010 0.159 -0.085 -0.245 -0.108 0.239 -0.104 -0.268 -0.062 -0.199 -0.471
(2.03) (2.23) (1.77) (1.78) (2.08) (2.36) (1.84) (1.96) (1.84) (1.82) (1.77)
Age 56.486 55.332 59.320 57.596 57.581 58.730 62.883 59.745 56.016 56.793 60.981
(12.57) (12.26) (10.86) (11.54) (10.92) (12.75) (10.26) (11.80) (12.83) (12.15) (10.26)
No Education 0.439 0.282 0.251 0.842 0.360 0.337 0.531 0.789 0.397 0.252 0.260
(0.50) (0.45) (0.43) (0.36) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50) (0.41) (0.49) (0.43) (0.44)
C. Primary 0.103 0.205 0.104 0.018 0.031 0.050 0.184 0.039 0.210 0.127 0.141
(0.30) (0.40) (0.30) (0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.39) (0.19) (0.41) (0.33) (0.35)
C. Secondary 0.050 0.089 0.039 0.009 0.014 0.071 0.068 0.012 0.004 0.042 0.021
(0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.09) (0.12) (0.26) (0.25) (0.11) (0.06) (0.20) (0.14)
Higher Education 0.078 0.055 0.015 0.022 0.008 0.061 0.092 0.029 0.015 0.059 0.040
(0.27) (0.23) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.24) (0.29) (0.17) (0.12) (0.23) (0.19)
Urban 0.326 0.187 0.114 0.255 0.325 0.348 0.333 0.342 0.195 0.181 0.271
(0.47) (0.39) (0.32) (0.44) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.40) (0.39) (0.44)
Observations 8957 10117 12281 18290 10081 7367 19547 8897 11460 7382 6046
Note: Pseudo-Fathers' Wealth, wealth of an individual born before 1960, head of household. No Education, dummy variable, 1 if individual has no education and 0 otherwise.
C. Primary, dummy variable, 1 if individual has completed primary school and 0 otherwise. C. Secondary, dummy variable, 1 if individual has completed secondary schooling
and 0 otherwise. Higher Education, dummy variable, 1 if an individual studies after secondary school and 0 otherwise. Age, age of an individual measured in years. Urban,
dummy variable, 1 if individual lives in an urban area and 0 if it lives in a rural area. First row means, Second row (in parenthesis) standard deviations.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics - Demographic and Health Survey





Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics - Demographic and Health Survey (continue)
Ghana Kenya Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Father
P. Wealth -0.918 -0.270 -0,1145 -0.237 -0.290 0.310 -0.569 -0.627 -0.248 -0.539 -0.349
(1.02) (1.41) (1.05) (1.06) (1.19) (1.61) (0.99) (1.01) (1.02) (1.08) (1.25)
Age 72.703 68.846 67.193 69.204 65.149 64.089 70.537 72.419 68.120 64.419 67.613
(11.54) (11.04) (12.90) (9.98) (11.53) (13.58) (10.91) (11.59) (11.40) (13.32) (10.21)
No Education 0.812 0.654 0.303 0.936 0.486 0.429 0.753 0.946 0.608 0.547 0.360
(0.39) (0.48) (0.46) (0.24) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43) (0.23) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
C. Primary 0.029 0.115 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.011 0.136 0.105 0.040
(0.17) (0.32) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.10) (0.34) (0.31) (0.03)
C. Secondary 0.000 0.038 0.017 0.013 0.000 0.089 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.973
(0.00) (0.19) (0.13) (0.11) (0.00) (0.29) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.16)
Higher Education 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.018 0.016 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.000
(0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.00)
Urban 0.159 0.192 0.126 0.331 0.365 0.446 0.205 0.204 0.184 0.140 0.400
(0.37) (0.40) (0.33) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.35) (0.49)
Observations 138 52 119 157 74 56 380 279 125 86 75
Note: P. Father Wealth, predicted wealth of the father of an individual born in and after 1960, head of household, whose father lives in the same household. No Education,
dummy variable, 1 if individual has no education and 0 otherwise. C. Primary, dummy variable, 1 if individual has completed primary school and 0 otherwise. C. Secondary,
dummy variable, 1 if individual has completed secondary schooling and 0 otherwise. Higher Education, dummy variable, 1 if an individual studies after secondary school and
0 otherwise. Age, age of an individual measured in years. Urban, dummy variable, 1 if individual lives in an urban area and 0 if it lives in a rural area. First row means, Second
row (in parenthesis) standard deviations.







Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics - Demographic and Health Survey (continue)
Ghana Kenya Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Son
Wealth -1.038 0.099 -0.061 -0.055 -0.020 0.650 -0.444 -0.806 0.232 -0.513 0.436
(1.48) (2.28) (1.56) (1.99) (2.15) (2.29) (1.71) (1.65) (2.15) (1.06) (2.36)
Age 31.529 31.865 30.630 34.318 29.797 32.500 33.811 36.742 32.936 31.605 33.293
(6.83) (6.80) (6.93) (6.35) (7.10) (7.62) (7.96) (6.79) (6.92) (7.67) (8.01)
No Education 0.449 0.173 0.084 0.631 0.095 0.161 0.268 0.746 0.088 0.093 0.040
(0.50) (0.38) (0.28) (0.48) (0.29) (0.37) (0.44) (0.44) (0.28) (0.29) (0.20)
C. Primary 0.065 0.212 0.126 0.013 0.068 0.054 0.182 0.050 0.624 0.151 0.280
(0.25) (0.41) (0.33) (0.11) (0.25) (0.23) (0.39) (0.22) (0.49) (0.36) (0.45)
C. Secondary 0.065 0.192 0.134 0.013 0.027 0.179 0.224 0.004 0.000 0.023 0.120
(0.25) (0.40) (0.34) (0.11) (0.16) (0.39) (0.42) (0.06) (0.00) (0.15) (0.33)
Higher Education 0.014 0.077 0.000 0.032 0.014 0.018 0.134 0.018 0.016 0.058 0.067
(0.12) (0.27) (0.00) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) (0.34) (0.13) (0.13) (0.24) (0.25)
Observations 138 52 119 157 74 56 380 279 125 86 75
Note: Sons' Wealth, wealth of an individual born in and after 1960, head of household, whose father lives in the same household. No Education, dummy variable, 1 if
individual has no education and 0 otherwise. C. Primary, dummy variable, 1 if individual has completed primary school and 0 otherwise. C. Secondary, dummy variable, 1 if
individual has completed secondary schooling and 0 otherwise. Higher Education, dummy variable, 1 if an individual studies after secondary school and 0 otherwise. Age,
age of an individual measured in years. Urban, dummy variable, 1 if individual lives in an urban area and 0 if it lives in a rural area. First row means, Second row (in
parenthesis) standard deviations.




Mean Standard Deviation Observations
Extensive – MEPV 0.282 0.46 39
Extensive – Fatalities 0.867 0.35 30
Intensive – Number of Events 118.633 207.15 30
Intensive – Fatalities 745.100 1848.24 30
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.837 0.08 35
Ethnic Polarization 0.483 0.15 35
Gini Coefficient 46.537 9.21 39
GDP per capita 10.167 2.79 39
Degree of Freedom 4.487 1.13 39
Urban Population 9387672.000 16700000.00 39
Mountainous Terrain            6.944 8.44 39
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics - Political Violence and other variables
Note: Extensive – MEPV, dummy variable equal to 1 if a Major Episode of Political Violence occurred
and 0 otherwise (a Major Episode of Political Violence is defined as an occurrence with more than 500 
reported deaths), source: Center for Systemic Peace. Extensive – Fatalities, dummy variable (provided 
there was a registered episode of political violence) equal to 1 if there is at least one death and 0
otherwise, source: ACLED. Intensive - Number of Events, count variable on the number of registered
episodes of political violence per year, source: ACLED. Intensive – Fatalities, (provided there was a
registered episode of political violence) count of deaths per year, source: ACLED. Ethnic
Fractionalization, index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization calculated using the data of the WCE,
source: Montlavo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Ethnic Polarization, index of ethnolinguistic
polarization calculated using the data of the WCE, source: Montlavo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Gini
Coefficient, GINI index (World Bank estimate), source: WDI. GDP per capita, log of real GDP per
capita (current LCU), source: WDI. Degree of Freedom, scale between 1 and 7, 1 being the least free
and 7 being the most free, source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Data, 1972-2013. Urban
Population, urban population, source: WDI. Mountainous Terrain, percent of mountainous terrain,
source: Fearon and Laitin (2003).
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Botswana Cape Verde Ghana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal South Africa Uganda Zambia
Age 27.612 27.008 30.073 29.851 30.163 28.851 31.659 30.349 29.367 28.083 30.911 30.672 29.972 29.122
(7.08) (7.29) (6.94) (7.48) (7.52) (6.93) (7.40) (7.71) (7.22) (6.92) (7.72) (7.69) (6.83) (7.36)
Head of Household 0.374 0.412 0.313 0.676 0.539 0.738 0.404 0.769 0.390 0.426 0.433 0.509 0.769 0.671
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.44) (0.49) (0.42) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.42) (0.47)
Urban 0.495 0.568 0.498 0.227 0.146 0.093 0.376 0.438 0.502 0.527 0.478 0.566 0.169 0.424
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.42) (0.35) (0.29) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.38) (0.50)
No Education 0.059 0.031 0.170 0.018 0.079 0.056 0.337 0.172 0.004 0.062 0.133 0.019 0.039 0.023
(0.24) (0.17) (0.38) (0.13) (0.27) (0.23) (0.47) (0.38) (0.06) (0.24) (0.34) (0.14) (0.19) (0.15)
C. Primary 0.154 0.272 0.239 0.209 0.169 0.169 0.031 0.231 0.127 0.081 0.025 0.066 0.172 0.125
(0.36) (0.45) (0.43) (0.41) (0.38) (0.38) (0.17) (0.42) (0.33) (0.27) (0.16) (0.25) (0.38) (0.33)
C. Secondary 0.289 0.160 0.143 0.291 0.079 0.109 0.098 0.024 0.317 0.349 0.059 0.323 0.115 0.243
(0.45) (0.37) (0.35) (0.45) (0.27) (0.31) (0.30) (0.15) (0.47) (0.48) (0.24) (0.47) (0.32) (0.43)
Higher Education 0.176 0.125 0.093 0.183 0.062 0.028 0.067 0.036 0.147 0.257 0.133 0.158 0.213 0.181
(0.38) (0.33) (0.29) (0.39) (0.24) (0.17) (0.25) (0.19) (0.35) (0.44) (0.34) (0.37) (0.41) (0.39)
Observations 273 257 259 611 178 248 255 169 259 545 203 424 615 304
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Afrobarometer
Individual Characteristics
Note: Age, age of an individual measured in years. Head of Household, dummy variable, 1 if individual in head of household and 0 otherwise. Urban, dummy variable, 1 if individual lives in an urban area and 0 if it
lives in a rural area. No Education, dummy variable, 1 if individual has no education and 0 otherwise. C. Primary, dummy variable, 1 if individual has completed primary school and 0 otherwise. C. Secondary, dummy
variable, 1 if individual has completed secondary schooling and 0 otherwise. Higher Education, dummy variable, 1 if an individual studies after secondary school and 0 otherwise. First row means, Second row (in
parenthesis) standard deviations.




Botswana Cape Verde Ghana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal South Africa Uganda Zambia
No Employment 0.593 0.440 0.386 0.525 0.775 0.810 0.761 0.710 0.398 0.484 0.690 0.465 0.485 0.497
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.42) (0.39) (0.43) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Part Time Employment 0.095 0.288 0.216 0.209 0.118 0.065 0.114 0.130 0.154 0.213 0.133 0.111 0.187 0.151
(0.29) (0.45) (0.41) (0.41) (0.32) (0.25) (0.32) (0.34) (0.36) (0.41) (0.34) (0.31) (0.39) (0.36)
Full Time Employment 0.311 0.272 0.398 0.265 0.107 0.125 0.125 0.160 0.448 0.303 0.177 0.425 0.328 0.352
(0.46) (0.45) (0.49) (0.44) (0.31) (0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.50) (0.46) (0.38) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48)
Income (first quintile) 0.044 0.272 0.459 0.160 0.107 0.077 0.365 0.000 0.154 0.094 0.182 0.045 0.195 0.299
(0.21) (0.45) (0.50) (0.37) (0.31) (0.27) (0.48) (0.00) (0.36) (0.29) (0.39) (0.21) (0.40) (0.46)
Income (second quintile) 0.168 0.241 0.270 0.191 0.062 0.040 0.188 0.349 0.193 0.156 0.099 0.191 0.180 0.158
(0.37) (0.43) (0.44) (0.39) (0.24) (0.20) (0.39) (0.48) (0.40) (0.36) (0.30) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37)
Income (third quintile) 0.187 0.101 0.085 0.245 0.096 0.069 0.224 0.124 0.208 0.172 0.123 0.229 0.164 0.168
(0.39) (0.30) (0.28) (0.43) (0.29) (0.25) (0.42) (0.33) (0.41) (0.38) (0.33) (0.42) (0.37) (0.37)
Income (fourth quintile) 0.128 0.035 0.035 0.124 0.129 0.121 0.071 0.065 0.143 0.327 0.138 0.179 0.200 0.036
(0.33) (0.18) (0.18) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.26) (0.25) (0.35) (0.47) (0.35) (0.38) (0.40) (0.19)
Income (fifth quintile) 0.099 0.004 0.008 0.036 0.045 0.218 0.012 0.018 0.089 0.116 0.020 0.151 0.093 0.000
(0.30) (0.06) (0.09) (0.19) (0.21) (0.41) (0.11) (0.13) (0.29) (0.32) (0.14) (0.36) (0.29) (0.00)
Observations 273 257 259 611 178 248 255 169 259 545 203 424 615 304
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Afrobarometer (continue)
Individual Characteristics
Note: No Employment, dummy variable, 1 if individual is not employed and 0 otherwise. Part Time Employment, dummy variable, 1 if individual is employed part time and 0 otherwise. Full Time Employment, dummy
variable, 1 if individual is employed full time variable and 0 otherwise. Income (first quintile), dummy variable, 1 if income of individual is in first quintile and 0 otherwise. Income (second quintile), dummy variable, 1 if
income of individual is in second quintile and 0 otherwise. Income (third quintile), dummy variable, 1 if income of individual is in third quintile and 0 otherwise. Income (fourth quintile), dummy variable, 1 if income of
individual is in fourth quintile and 0 otherwise. Income (fifth quintile), dummy variable, 1 if income of individual is in fifth quintile and 0 otherwise. First row means, Second row (in parenthesis) standard deviations.






Botswana Cape Verde Ghana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Mali Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal South Africa Uganda Zambia
School 0.626 0.665 0.946 0.766 0.652 0.851 0.616 0.899 0.625 0.895 0.926 0.788 0.954 0.822
(0.48) (0.47) (0.23) (0.42) (0.48) (0.36) (0.49) (0.30) (0.48) (0.31) (0.26) (0.41) (0.21) (0.38)
Police 0.527 0.187 0.301 0.182 0.146 0.089 0.071 0.349 0.432 0.442 0.300 0.455 0.260 0.293
(0.50) (0.39) (0.46) (0.39) (0.35) (0.28) (0.26) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.44) (0.46)
Health Clinic 0.344 0.237 0.548 0.340 0.219 0.294 0.376 0.473 0.332 0.719 0.581 0.566 0.654 0.569
(0.48) (0.43) (0.50) (0.47) (0.41) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
Electricity Grid 0.857 0.837 0.625 0.409 0.270 0.218 0.310 0.391 0.421 0.694 0.576 0.830 0.231 0.513
(0.35) (0.37) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) (0.41) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.46) (0.50) (0.38) (0.42) (0.50)
Piped Water 0.850 0.607 0.591 0.339 0.281 0.194 0.357 0.426 0.502 0.490 0.571 0.821 0.158 0.401
(0.36) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.40) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.38) (0.36) (0.49)
Sewage 0.392 0.366 0.328 0.146 0.180 0.036 0.192 0.243 0.421 0.347 0.315 0.677 0.091 0.257
(0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.35) (0.39) (0.19) (0.39) (0.43) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.29) (0.44)
Observations 273 257 259 611 178 248 255 169 259 545 203 424 615 304
Location Characteristics
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Afrobarometer (continue)
Note: School, dummy variable, 1 if enumeration area has a school and 0 otherwise. Police, dummy variable, 1 if enumeration area has a police station and 0 otherwise. Health Clinic, dummy variable, 1 if enumeration area
has a health clinic and 0 otherwise. Electricity Grid, dummy variable, 1 if enumeration area has an electricity grid and 0 otherwise. Piped Water, dummy variable, 1 if enumeration area has piped water and 0 otherwise.
Sewage, dummy variable, 1 if enumeration area has sewage and 0 otherwise. First row means, Second row (in parenthesis) standard deviations.
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Table A.4: IV First-Stage Regression 
(1) (2) (3)
Availability of goods 0.186*** 0.214*** 0.184***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Individual Controls no no yes
Location Controls no no yes
Country Fixed Effects no yes yes
Observations 4832 4832 4832
Note: First-Stage OLS regression. Explained variable, difference
between self-reported current well-being of an individual and the well-
being of its parents 10 years ago (integer scale between -10 and 10; -
10=an individual is 10 times worse than its parents, 0=an individual
has the same well-being as his parents, 10=an individual is 10 times
better than his parents. Explanatory variable, Present vs Past
availability of goods (1= Much Worse, 2=Worse, 3=About the Same,
4=Better, 5=Much Better). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
